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This paper introduces search cost in the theory of tax competition. It stud-
ies tax competition in search markets for foreign direct investors when the
statutory tax rates are known but the eﬀective tax base is not known, caus-
ing search costs to ﬁrms which are trying to ﬁnd out countries’ eﬀective
tax burdens prior to the investment location choice.1 Tax rates of diﬀerent
countries are typically well advertised and known or are accessible virtually
without cost. It is much more diﬃcult to learn the details of a country’s tax
rules, such as depreciation allowances, tax treatment of R&D investment,
treatment of capital gains, the integration of corporate taxation with other
elements of the national tax system, a country’s ﬁnancial regulation and its
rules regarding transfer pricing. A ﬁrm needs to know and to assess what
these rules imply for tax optimization and for the resulting eﬀective tax base
for a given investment project.2 We ﬁnd: as a variant of Diamond’s (1971)
monopoly pricing paradox3, the cost of learning countries’ eﬀective tax base
has drastic consequences for the equilibrium outcome of tax competition.4
From a structural point of view, Harrington and Leahey (2007) is closest to
our paper. They consider price competition between ﬁrms with unobserved
delivery costs adding to sales prices. In our framework, countries compete
for ﬁrms, and the (observed) tax rate and the (unobserved) tax base inter-
1For a recent survey of this large literature see Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005). Search
cost is not an issue that has been considered in this literature.
2As stated by the European Commission (2001, p.37): "[...] each Member State has
its own sets of rules, in particular laws and conventions on ﬁnancial accounting, rules
for determining taxable proﬁt, arrangements for collection and administration of tax and
its own network of tax treaties. The need to comply with a multiplicity of diﬀerent rules
entails a considerable compliance cost and represents in itself a signiﬁcant barrier to cross-
border economic activity."
3Many variants of this Diamond paradox have been explored. Burdett and Judd (1983)
analyzed a more general framework in which some ﬁrms may be informed about the prices
in multiple ﬁrms, and showed that this may lead to an equilibrium with price dispersion,
instead of monopoly pricing. More recent contributions are McAfee (1995), Baye and
Morgan (2001), Arbatskaya (2007), Ireland (2007) who considers ﬁrms which sell through
diﬀerent outlets. Harrington (2001) considers competition in which price and quality are
uncertain, with a high search cost for quality and a low search cost for the price.
4Unlike in Fuest (1995) who considers tax competition with redundancy of tax instru-
ments, tax rate and tax base are not perfect substitutes here, as they diﬀer by the aspect
of search cost.
2act multiplicatively. We show that competition pressure may occur, despite
the existence of search cost, depending on the size of the minimum feasible
tax base. Our results show why competition can lead to a tax-cut-cum-
base-broadening and explain this recent trend in the context of corporate
taxation. It contributes a further explanation for the puzzle5 as to why cor-
porate tax rates dropped in the last 25 years in OECD countries, whereas
tax revenues from corporate taxation were sustained.6
2 The formal framework
We look for (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the following game
with complete, but imperfect, information. There are n ex-ante identi-
cal countries j =1 ,...,n, and a set of investors i with measure 1.7 Each
country chooses a statutory tax rate tj ∈ [τ0,τ1] ⊆ [0,1] a n dat a xb a s e
bj ∈ [β0,β1] ⊆ [0,1]. The product of tax rate and tax base in a country is
called the eﬀective tax burden and denoted
Tj = tjbj. (1)
This Tj is the ﬁscal price which investors have to pay for investing in country
j. Each investor maximizes his net proﬁt. He costlessly observes the statu-
tory tax rates t1,...,t n.T h ee ﬀective tax bases b1,...,b n are determined by
a large number of details in the tax code such as depreciation rules or cost
deduction allowances, the conduct of the tax administration, for instance,
regarding transfer pricing issues or auditing habits, on speciﬁc characteris-
tics of the investment project and its ﬂexibility for tax optimization in the
respective institutional framework. Evidently, bj should be understood as a
metaphor for the less easily observable co-determinants of eﬀective tax bur-
den. To learn the actual bj of country j the investor has a positive cost that
is equal to c>0. To learn the tax bases of a set Ki ⊆ {1,...,n} of countries,
5See Sørensen (2007) and De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) for a balanced discussion.
6Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008), for instance, report a drop in the average
of the statutory rates of corporate taxation in the OECD countries from about 50 percent
to under 35 percent in the period between the early Eighties and 2001. Devereux, Griﬃth
and Klemm (2002) provide evidence for sustained tax revenue, despite these drops in rates.
7We deliberately choose a framework in which the diﬀerent countries are as homogenous
as possible along all dimensions ex ante, before choosing their tax burdens. Without search
costs, this framework would yield a race to the bottom.
3the search cost is equal to (#Ki)c,w i t h#Ki the number of countries in
Ki. For these countries j ∈ Ki, investor i knows the eﬀective tax burden
Tj.F o ra l lj/ ∈ Ki, i must form a belief about Tj, described by a (possibly
degenerate) probability distribution Fj(Tj). Each investor invests one unit
of capital (or does not invest at all).8 The investment turns into a gross
proﬁto fs i z eπ(Tj). For this function, we assume that a higher tax rate
reduces this gross proﬁt. More precisely, π(0) is the ‘laissez-faire’ proﬁt, π
is a concave function of Tj (i.e., π0 < 0 and π00 ≤ 0) in the range Tj ∈ [0,1]
and zero for Tj > 1. Intuitively, this is a short-hand notion for the idea that
ﬁrms adjust their local business activity to taxation, that their activity will
be negatively aﬀected by a higher eﬀective tax burden, and that ﬁrms have
an exit option, which rules out an inﬁnitely high tax burden. The gross
proﬁt π is subject to the eﬀective tax burden. Hence, the proﬁtn e to ft a x e s
and net of search costs for the investor i who expends (#Ki)c units of search
costs and invests in country j is
(1 − tjbj)π(tjbj) − (#Ki)c.( 2 )
Each government maximizes its tax revenues.9 If αj ∈ (0,1) is the share of
investors who invest in country j, then the tax revenue in country j is
αjtjbjπ(tjbj) (3)
where αj can, in general, be a function of ((t1,b 1),...,(tn,b n))
We consider the following timing. Stage 1: the countries choose their
statutory tax rates and their tax base deﬁnitions. Stage 2: the investors
choose which information they will acquire about tax base deﬁnitions. Stage
3: investment choices take place.
It is useful to deﬁne the following benchmark: in the absence of tax
competition, αj is exogenous. This makes (3) a monotonic and concave
function of the eﬀective tax burden and has a unique maximum that is
implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
Tjπ0(Tj)+π(Tj)=0 .( 4 )
8It is possible that the investor does not invest at all, but we will not consider this con-
straint explicitly in what follows, as it will not be binding under fairly general conditions.
9This is a standard assumption and may describe Leviathan government or a benevolent
government that may want to extract revenue from non-resident investors on behalf of its
population.
4We denote the solution to (4) as Tm and call Tm the eﬀective monopoly tax.
Proposition 1 The following strategy proﬁle and beliefs constitute a weak
perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (i) For τ0β1 <T m : All countries choose
tj = τ0 and bj = β1. Investors believe that
bj = β1 for tj ≤ Tm/β1
bj = Tm/tj for tj ∈ (Tm/β1,T m/β0]
bj = β0 for tj >T m/β0
(5)
with probability 1. They choose Ki = ∅ and invest in one of the countries
with the (according to the beliefs) lowest eﬀective tax burden. (ii) For τ0β1 ≥
Tm ≥ τ0β0 : All countries choose tjbj with tj ∈ [τ0,τ1], bj ∈ [β0,β1] such
that tjbj = Tm. Investors i believe that
tjbj = Tm for tj ∈ [Tm/β1,T m/β0]
tjbj = tjβ0 >T m for tj >T m/β0.
(6)
with probability 1. They choose Ki = ∅ and invest in one of the countries
with the lowest (believed) eﬀective tax burden.
Proof. (i) In stage 3, each investor i knows bj for j ∈ Ki and has beliefs
(5) about countries’ bj for j/ ∈ Ki. The investor chooses the country with
the lowest tjbj and randomizes between the diﬀerent countries if there are
several countries with the same eﬀective tax burden. In stage 2, each investor
i observes t1,...,t n and chooses Ki. Given that the beliefs (5) are degenerate,
the investor does not expect to learn anything from search. Hence, Ki =
∅. Turning to stage 1, for tk = τ0,b k = β1 for all k 6= j, the country j
chooses (tj,b j) to maximize (3). For tj >τ 0 and given the beliefs in (5),
all investors expect the ﬁscal burden to be higher in this country than in
the other countries. The country receives a tax revenue equal to zero in the




and, as τ0β1 <T m, this reaches its maximum for bj = β1.N o t e a l s o t h a t
t h eb e l i e f sa r ec o n s i s t e n ta l o n gt h ee q u i l i b r i u mp a t h .
5The reasoning for case (ii) is analogous for stages 2 and 3. In stage 1,
countries anticipate that Ki = ∅. Given the simultaneous choices tkbk = Tm
for k 6= j,c o u n t r yj anticipates that j’s tax revenue is equal to
1
ntjbjπ(tjbj) if tj ∈ [Tm/β1,T m/β0]
0 if tj >T m/β0.
(8)
Accordingly, j chooses tj ∈ [Tm/β1,T m/β0] and a tax burden deﬁnition that
maximizes tjbjπ(tjbj) for this tj. This maximand is bj = Tm/tj.N o t ea l s o
that the beliefs are consistent along the equilibrium path.
Cases (i) and (ii) have in common that no search costs are incurred.
Given the expectations of identical equilibrium eﬀective tax base choices in
the diﬀerent countries, a costly search does not pay. In turn, because no ﬁrm
searches, countries cannot attract additional investors by the choice of a low
eﬀective tax base. If the ﬁrms could commit to search actively, this would
introduce competitive pressure, as a country j that reduces bj is rewarded
with additional investment. Such search is, however, not time consistent. As
a result, competitive pressure is limited for case (i) and vanishes completely
for case (ii).
In case (ii) the tax burdens are equal to the tax burdens in autarchy.
This result closely corresponds with the original result in Diamond (1971)
and the recent result on additive two-component prices by Harrington and
Leahey (2007).
The more important result is for case (i). It shows that, despite the
absence of search in the equilibrium, the costless observability of the tax
rate exerts some partial competitive pressure on the eﬀective tax burdens.
As the tax base is bounded from above, the maximum possible eﬀective tax
burden can credibly be limited by the country if it chooses a tax rate that
is so small that the product of this tax rate with the maximum possible
(unobserved) tax base is smaller than the eﬀective monopoly tax (i.e., if
τ0β1 <T m). For τ0 =0even the full race to the bottom occurs. Note
also that the equilibrium in case (i) has very low tax rates, combined with
broad tax bases. This property is in line with the stylized facts on tax rate
reductions and tax base broadening.
63C o n c l u s i o n s
Search cost for the eﬀective tax burden is typically assumed away in tax
competition analysis. However, if there is a cost to learning the true size of
some of the determinants of the actual eﬀective tax burden, this may limit
the amount of competition pressure and may even support a tax compe-
tition equilibrium in which countries choose the eﬀective tax burden that
maximizes tax revenue, just as in the case with autarchy. The result is com-
patible with a large variety of combinations of tax rates and tax bases and
may add to the existing explanations for why the trend towards lower statu-
tory tax rates occurred in parallel with the increase in international openness
in recent decades, and why it was complemented with a broadening of the
corporate tax base.
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